Reducing FTM ranging and location attack exposure with crowd-wisdom
Abstract
802.11 Fine Timing Measurement is an indoor ranging technique. Because it is unauthenticated and unprotected, an adversary can implement ranging and location attacks, by inserting one or more rogue responders and causing an unsuspecting client to incorporate forged values into its location computation. We show in this paper that protection intended for attacks on comparable ranging techniques, like GPS, are ineffective in the case of FTM. However, we also show that a crowd-sourcing technique that confirms that one AP is known by the others can mitigate the attack exposure.
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